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Abstract
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are growing enormously and becoming
increasingly attractive for a variety of application areas such as tele-health
monitoring, industry monitoring, home automation and many more. The pri-
mary weakness shared by all wireless application and technologies is the
vulnerability to security attacks/threats. The performance and behaviour of a
WSN are vastly affected by such attacks. In order to be able to better address
the vulnerabilities of WSNs in terms of security, it is important to understand
the behaviour of the attacks.
This paper addresses the behavioural modelling of medium access control
(MAC) security attacks in WSNs. The MAC layer is responsible for energy
consumption, delay and channel utilization of the network and attacks on this
layer can introduce significant degradation of the individual sensor nodes due
Journal of Cyber Security and Mobility, 65–82.
© 2012 River Publishers. All rights reserved.
66 P. M. Pawar et al.
to energy drain and in performance due to delays. The behavioural modelling
of attacks will be beneficial for designing efficient and secure MAC layer proto-
cols. The security attacks are modelled using a sequential diagram approach of
Unified Modelling Language (UML). Further, a new attack definition, specific
to hybrid MAC mechanisms, is proposed.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks (WSNs), media access control
(MAC), unified modelling language (UML), security and
attacks.
1 Introduction
A WSN consists of a number of small nodes, equipped with sensors, which
together form a network that can perform tasks by communicating with each
other using a radio. WSNs have been used in many applications such as
tele-health monitoring, intelligent transportation, industry monitoring, home
automation and so on. Potentially, many of these WSN applications carry
sensitive information, therefore to protect applications from different kind of
denial of service attacks such as denial of sleep, collision attacks, exhaustion
attacks and jamming attacks is a prime concern.
As compared with traditional network security, security in WSNs is more
complex mainly due to computational constrains of the nodes and the objective
to conserve energy in order to maximize the lifetime of the network and the
individual nodes. The unpredictable communication channel and unattended
operation make security in WSN seven harder [1].
A WSN network is susceptible to many different security attacks at all
layers of communication and these attacks can introduce a large amount of
inconsistencies in the network. In order to address attacks in a WSN through
development of good security mechanisms, it is important to understand the
behaviour of the attacks [2].
The MAC layer plays a central part in the operation of a WSN where it
is responsible for determining energy consumption, channel capacity utiliza-
tion and network delay [3]. These responsibilities of the MAC layer makes
it vulnerable to many different attacks such as collision attacks, denial of
sleep attacks, exhaustion attacks, etc. These attacks introduce large delays
and increase the energy drain in the individual sensor nodes. Current research
Behavioural Modelling of WSN MAC Layer Security Attacks: A Sequential UML Approach 67
in WSN security has focused less on security on the MAC security. However,
understanding the behaviour of MAC security attacks is important in order
to develop secure mechanisms for the MAC layer. The aim of this paper is
to understand and model the behaviour of WSN MAC security attacks for
development of efficient MAC mechanisms.
The UML based approach has been chosen for better analysis of security
attacks behaviour [4, 5]. UML is a well-known modelling methodology and
is a standard notation of real-world objects as a first step in developing an
object-oriented design methodology. It is used as the language for specifying,
visualizing and constructing the artefacts of the system. UML represents a
collection of the best engineering practices that have proven successful in the
modelling of large and complex systems. The important benefit of UML is that
it provides security developers standardized methodologies for visualizing
security attacks that are present in WSNs. Little research has been done in
UML modelling of a WSN environment especially concerning the security.
This paper proposes behavioural modelling of WSN MAC security attacks
using sequence diagrams. It shows the interaction between different objects
in a network. It will be advantageous to develop competent secure MAC [6].
Further, the paper proposes a new attack definition named the Explicit Con-
tention Notification (ECN) attack for hybrid MAC mechanisms. This attack
can take place in hybrid MAC mechanisms such as Z-MAC [7], in which the
malicious node will transmit the false ECN messages and increase the energy
drain and delays in the WSN.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of MAC layer security and different attacks. Section 3 presents the
behavioural modelling of WSN MAC security attacks. Section 4 gives the
details of the proposed attack and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 MAC Layer Security and Attacks
Most of the research in WSN security has concentrated on the confidentiality
and integrity of the data in the network. Due to the limited energy of a WSN, it
remains extremely vulnerable to security attacks draining this, the most critical
resource. The MAC protocol is responsible for managing the radio of sensor,
which is the main source of power consumption. To design a secure MAC
layer it is crucial to understand the normal and malicious sources of energy
loss, which is essential to design the power control system.
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Different security attacks, which amplify the energy drains and delays, can
majorly affect the performance of the MAC layer. The effect of these attacks
on the MAC layer performance can be minimized or removed, if the behaviour
of the attacks is analysed and modelled. It enlightens the sequence of activities
perform by attacker or malicious node. The following subsections explain the
main MAC security attacks in detail.
2.1 Collision Attack
The malicious collision attack [8, 9] can be easily launched by a compromised
sensor node. In a collision attack, a malicious node does not follow the MAC
protocol rules and causes collisions with neighbouring nodes’ transmissions
by sending a short noise packet. This attack does not consume much energy
of the attacker but can cause a lot of disruptions to the network operation. It
is difficult to detect this attack because of the broadcast nature of the wireless
environment.
2.2 Unintelligent Replay Attack
In case of the unintelligent replay attack [10], the attacker does not have MAC
protocol knowledge and no ability to penetrate the network. Here, recorded
events are replayed into the network which prevent nodes from entering sleep
mode and lead to waste in energy in receiving and processing the extra packets.
If nodes are not equipped with an anti-replay mechanism this attack causes
the replayed traffic to be forwarded through the network, consuming power at
each node on the path to the destination. The replaying of events has adverse
effect on the network lifetime and overall performance of WSN.
2.3 Unauthenticated Broadcast Attack
In an unauthenticated broadcast attack [10], the attacker has full knowledge of
the MAC protocol but does not have the capability to penetrate the network.
Here, the attacker broadcasts the unauthenticated traffic into the network by
following all MAC rules. These unauthenticated and unnecessary broadcast
messages are disturbing the normal sleep and listen cycle of the node and
place most of the nodes in listen mode for an extended amount of time; it leads
to increase in energy consumption and reduction in network lifetime. These
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attacks cause server harm to MAC protocols that are having short messages
and short adaptive timeout period.
2.4 Full Domination Attack
Here, the attacker has full knowledge of the MAC layer protocol and ability
to penetrate the network. This type of attack is one of the most destructive
to a WSN as the attacker has the ability to produce trusted traffic to gain
the maximum possible impact from denial of sleep. The attacks are mounted
using one or more compromised nodes in the network. All kinds of MAC layer
protocols are vulnerable to this kind of attack [10].
2.5 Exhaustion Attack
The attacker who commences an exhaustion attack [10] has knowledge about
the MAC protocol and the ability to penetrate the network. These attacks are
possible only in case of request to send (RTS)/clear to send (CTS) based MAC
protocols. In this attack, the malicious node sends RTS to a node and if the
node replies with CTS, the malicious node will repeatedly transmit the RTS to
the node, which will prevent the node from going into sleep mode and instead
drain the total energy of the node. These attacks are affecting the node lifetime
and can partition the network.
2.6 Intelligent Jamming Attack
The intelligent jamming attack is one of the most disastrous attacks where
attacker has full protocol knowledge but does not have the ability to penetrate
the network. The attacker injects unauthenticated unicast and broadcast pack-
ets into the network. These attacks can differentiate between control traffic and
data traffic and unlike the unauthenticated replay attack it replays the selective
events (control or data) [10, 11].
3 Behavioural Modelling of MAC Security Attacks
3.1 UML Modelling
UML [5] is a language for specifying, visualizing, constructing, and docu-
menting the artefacts and is used to evolve and derive the system. It presents a
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standard way to show interactions/behaviour within the system that provides a
conceptual understanding of system functionality.The UML provides a large
set of diagrams such as use case diagram, sequence diagram, activity dia-
gram, state machine diagram, deployment diagrams and many more to model
the system behaviour.
The focus of this paper is to use UML to model security attacks using
sequence diagrams [5]. The sequence diagram is used primarily to show the
interactions between objects in the sequential order in which they occur also
known as message sequence charts. A sequence diagram shows, as parallel
vertical lines, different processes or objects that live simultaneously, and, as
horizontal arrows, the messages exchanged between them, in the order in
which they occur. Here, the different nodes in the network and the external
attacker are considered as objects and the interactions of the nodes after initi-
ation of the attack are shown.
3.2 Modelling of Security Attacks
3.2.1 Collision attack
Figure 1 explains the flow of events in case of collision attacks. The details of
each event are as follows:
• An external attacker initiates the collision attack through the mali-
cious node 3.
• Once the attack is initiated on node 3, it will start to send noise
packets to all nodes in the network. It will increase the traffic in the
network causing the channel to become busy doing this activity.
• Node 1 detects an event and sends a RTS packet to node 2. At the
same time the malicious node 3 also generates a noise packet and
forwards it towards node 2. Both packets will reach node 2 simul-
taneously and cause a collision.
• Again, node 1 detects the event and checks channel availability
by exchanging RTS and CTS with node 2. Once node 1 receives
the CTS from node 2, node 1 starts to send data packets towards
node 2. If, at the same time, the malicious node 3 also sends noise
packets toward node 2, collisions will happen in the network.
• The malicious node 3 is continuously generating noise packets that
make the channel constantly busy. During this, if any other node
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Figure 1 Sequence diagram of collision attack.
tries to use the channel, a collision will take place. This collision
of packets leads to retransmission of the packets that in turn leads
to increasing energy consumption.
3.2.2 Unintelligent replay attack
Figure 2 explains the flow of events in case of an unintelligent replay attack.
The details of each event areas follow:
• An external attacker initiates the unintelligent replay attack through
the malicious node 4.
• The malicious node 4 detects the event and sends an unauthen-
ticated data/control packet towards the sink hop by hop, node
4 ->node 3 -> node 2 -> node 1.
• After some time, the malicious node 4 will replay the event and
will forward it through the network. Here, the malicious node does
not differentiate between control and data packets.
72 P. M. Pawar et al.
Figure 2 Sequence diagram of unintelligent replay attack.
• The event will be replayed again and again which increases the
traffic in the network and prevents the nodes from going into sleep
mode. An increasing number of nodes will be in listen mode, max-
imizing the power consumption at each node on the path to the
destination. During this, if any other node tries to send a packet, it
will get channel busy.
3.2.3 Unauthenticated broadcast attack
Figure 3 explains the flow of events in case of the unauthenticated broadcast
attack. The details of each event are as follows:
• An external attacker initiates an unauthenticated broadcast attack
through themalicious node 3.
• The malicious node 3 detects the event and broadcasts packet to
the whole network.
• Whenever the packet reaches anode, the node will try to authen-
ticate it but authentication will fail because, even though, in this
attack, the attacker has full protocol knowledge, it does not have
the ability to penetrate the network.
• Every time the malicious node 3 detects the event and broadcasts
the packet to the whole network. This unnecessary broadcasting
of packets will waste energy in all nodes in the network because
nodes will have to wake up to listen due to the event.
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Figure 3 Sequence diagram of unauthorised broadcast attack.
• Node 4 detects the event and sends the message towards node 3.
If, at the same time, the malicious node 3 detects and broadcasts
the event, it leads to a collision on the channel between node 3 and
node 4.
3.2.4 Full domination attack
Figure 4 explains the flow of events in case of full domination attack. The
details of each event areas follow:
• An external attacker initiates the full domination attack through the
malicious nodes 2 and 4.
• The malicious node 4 detects the event and broadcasts the message
to the network. Here, the message is accepted by all nodes because,
in this attack, the attacker has full knowledge of the MAC protocol
and the ability to penetrate the network.
• The malicious node 2 detects the event and broadcasts the message
to the network.
• The malicious node 2 replays the event again after some time and
broadcasts it to whole network. The repeated broadcasting of the
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Figure 4 Sequence diagram of full domination attack.
event will prevent nodes from going into sleep mode, thus increas-
ing the overall power consumption.
• Node 3 detects an event and sends the data and this collides with
the broadcast message sent by the malicious node 2.
3.2.5 Exhaustion attack
Figure 5 explains the flow of events in case of the exhaustion attack. The
details of each event are as follows:
• An external attacker initiates an exhaustion attack through the mali-
cious node 4.
• Node 1 detects the event and exchanges RTS and CTS and finally
sends the data to node 2.
• The malicious node 4 detects an event and sends RTS to node 2.
Node 2 will reply by CTS. After that, the malicious node will
repeatedly generate a RTS packet and transmit it towards node 2
until the total energy of node 2 is exhausted.
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Figure 5 Sequence diagram of exhaustion attack.
3.2.6 Intelligent jamming attack
Figure 6 explains the flow of events in case of intelligent jamming attack. The
details of each event areas follow:
• An external attacker initiates an intelligent jamming attack through
the malicious node 4.
• The malicious node 4 detects the control event and transmits the
unauthenticated unicast message to node 3.
• Node 3 detects an event and forwards the message towards node 1,
this message collides with the message broadcasted by the mali-
cious node 4.
• The malicious node 4 detects an event and broadcasts the unau-
thenticated broadcast message in the network.
• The malicious node 4 uses the knowledge of the MAC layer proto-
col for selective replay of data or control events. Node 4 replays the
previously detected data event and transmits the unauthenticated
unicast message to node 2.
• The malicious node 4 selectively replays the control event
and broadcasts the unauthenticated control message in the
network.
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Figure 6 Sequence diagram for intelligent jamming attack.
4 ECN Attack for Hybrid MAC
4.1 Working Model
In case of a hybrid MAC mechanism such as Z-MAC (Zebra-MAC), an ECN
message is used to notify all nodes in the network about a collision. The nodes
will get the understanding of the contention by using ECN messages and they
will act accordingly using this information. Figure 4 shows the normal pro-
cessing along with the ECN attack. Figure 7(a) shows the three different paths
from the intermediate node that may lead to contention at the intermediate
node. The intermediate node experiences the contention and transmits the
ECN message to all nodes in the network as shown in Figure 7(b). Figure 7(c)
shows the ECN attack in which the malicious node, which has full knowledge
of the MAC layer protocol used, will generate the ECN message and try to
confuse the nodes, which disturbs the normal communication of the nodes and
also incurs increased consumption of energy.
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Figure 7 (a) Collision at intermediate node (b) Intermediate node sends an ECN message to all nodes for
collision information (c) Attack in which malicious node will unnecessarily transmit the ECN message.
4.2 Behavioural Modelling of the ECN Attack
Figure 8 explains the flow of events in case of ECN attack. The details of each
event are as follows,
• Node 4 detects the event and transmits the message towards the
sink node via node 4->node 3->node 2-> node 1 to the sink node.
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Figure 8 Sequence diagram for ECN attack.
During this transmission, node 3 will detect some event and tries to
transmit towards the sink node and experiences the collision at the
intermediate node 2. Node 2 measures the level of contention and
transmits the ECN message to all one-hop and two-hop neighbours
in the network.
• The same situation can be observed when node 3 and node 2 sense
the event and experience the collision at node 1 after some time.
Node 1 transmits the ECN message to the nodes in the network.
• The external attacker compromises the malicious node 4 by ini-
tiating an ECN attack. Once the attack is initiated the malicious
node transmits the unnecessary ECN messages in the network and
confuses the normal communication.
5 Conclusion
The applications of WSN are growing rapidly and these new applications
have very stringent requirements concerning energy efficiency and security.
In WSN, security is important at all layers because all layers are susceptible
to security attacks. These security attacks directly affect the energy consump-
tion and due to the large amount of energy consumed at the MAC layer, it
is particularly vulnerable to many different security attacks. To protect the
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MAC layer from attackers, it is necessary to understand the behaviour of the
attacks so that secure MAC mechanisms can be developed. By better under-
standing the behaviour of the attacks, there is a better chance of finding solid
solutions.
The UML based behavioural modelling of MAC security attacks gives this
understanding of the behaviour of the attacks and the interaction of the system
in presence of these attacks. This behavioural analysis is useful to develop
efficient and secure solutions for the MAC layer.
In this paper, we also proposed the ECN attack that can be used in hybrid
MAC mechanisms and we also give its behavioural modelling using UML.
The attack drains the energy by introducing false ECN messages.
The future work will exploit UML modelling of MAC layer attacks using
activity diagrams, implement security attacks on hybrid MAC mechanism
and conduct performance evaluation on hybrid MAC algorithms in presence
of attacks.
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